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INTRODUCTION
At 3:30 PM EST on March 11, 2020, National Basketball Association (NBA) team
owners concluded a conference call regarding the Covid-19 pandemic. They believed
that Commissioner Adam Silver would soon announce that games would proceed in
empty arenas. While European soccer leagues had canceled matches, just the day before
the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) had taken the more tepid step of
announcing that the March Madness tournaments would be played without fans in the
stands. There were only about a thousand confirmed cases of coronavirus in the United
States at that time, and the NBA owners were divided on how to proceed. According to
Ramona Shelburne’s (2020) reporting for ESPN, the respective owners of the Golden
State Warriors, the Oklahoma City Thunder, and the Houston Rockets argued for a
temporary postponement of games. But the majority of owners prevailed in support of
the less drastic plan in which the season would continue as scheduled, albeit without
the presence of spectators.
Meanwhile, in Oklahoma City, Rudy Gobert, star center for the Utah Jazz, was
confined to a hotel room, awaiting the results of a Covid-19 test he had taken that
morning. As his teammates warmed up on the Thunder’s court and fans took their seats,
Gobert received the news that he had tested positive for the contagious and potentially
deadly virus. Minutes from the 8:00 PM EST tipoff, as the general managers of the Jazz
and Thunder, Oklahoma City public health officials, and Adam Silver scrambled to
formulate a new plan, the arena announcer told fans that there would be a thirty-minute
delay of game (Shelburne 2020; Cacciola and Deb 2020). The referees directed players
to the locker room where they would don protective gear and wait. Shortly thereafter,
arena loudspeakers reassured fans that they were safe, but informed them the game was
postponed and they were to exit the arena.
For Americans at home, the evening of March 11 offered a startling line-up of
television, beginning with a halting and hesitant declaration of a national state of
emergency from the White House, followed by news of plummeting stock futures and
an announcement that beloved Hollywood couple, Tom Hanks and Rita Wilson, had
contracted the disease. Finally, viewers watched a surreal scene unfold at Chesapeake
Energy Arena in Oklahoma City as the NBA announced that an unnamed player had
tested positive for the Covid-19 virus, leading to an immediate suspension of all games.

Silver characterized the suspension order as “a split-second decision” (Shelburne
2020). In the twenty-four hours that followed, the National Hockey League (NHL),
Major League Baseball (MLB), Major League Soccer (MLS), and the NCAA all
followed suit, but by early March, the conditions were such that it seemed pre-ordained
that the NBA should be the league to lead the way. In this chapter, we argue that beyond
practical considerations, the NBA’s position as the most socially and culturally
progressive of the major U.S. sports leagues informed its decision to suspend games,
even as both government officials and other sporting entities dithered.

WAS THE NBA SHUTDOWN JUST COMMON SENSE?
There were, of course, pragmatic reasons related to the timing of the outbreak and the
particular circumstances of professional basketball that may have helped push the NBA
toward an early shutdown decision. Unlike the NFL or MLB, the NBA in early March
was on the homestretch of its regular season. Continuing to play, even in empty arenas,
would mean exposing players, coaches, and training staffs three to four times a week
to the risk of contracting the virus, putting the lucrative postseason playoffs in jeopardy.
Furthermore, Commissioner Silver must have been aware that the powerful NBA
Players Association could preemptively step in to protect player health (Coleman 2019).
At that point, however, NBA union leaders—and leaders of similarly strong unions like
the MLBPA—had not spoken out prominently about the Covid-19 threat.
Given the nature of the sport itself, the NBA also had fewer options than other
leagues for protecting players from viral transmission on the court if play were to
continue. By early March, it was already suspected that the Covid-19 virus, like other
respiratory viruses, spreads more effectively in enclosed, climate-controlled
environments (Schuchat 2020), so Silver may have viewed playing in indoor arenas
(rather than the open-air stadiums of outdoor sports) as an unacceptable risk. While it
is hard to imagine many professional athletes consenting to wearing a mask during
competition, adding a version of a protective face shield to helmets—hypothetically
possible in football, hockey, or even baseball—was not an option for basketball players.
Furthermore, the smaller playing area and requirement of constant man-to-man defense
likely puts NBA players in more continuous direct physical contact with each other than
in any other major team sport. Still, every league faced risks and challenges related to
the virus, and the idea of a sports league shutting down completely had not yet entered
the public consciousness. It seems unlikely that these practical factors alone would
explain Silver’s monumental decision to suspend the season effective immediately after
a single positive test for Covid-19 among the players.

STERN, SILVER, AND THE CULTURE OF THE NBA
From the early days of the NBA, players were active in social and racial justice causes,
from Elgin Baylor boycotting games in cities with segregated hotels to Bill Russell and
Kareem Abdul-Jabbar (still a college player at that time) supporting the Olympic
Project for Human Rights ahead of the 1968 Summer Olympics (Woike 2020). Still,
the NBA’s mid-March shutdown decision might not have happened absent the cultural
sea change within the league brought about by its current commissioner, Adam Silver,
and his immediate predecessor, the late David Stern. Although Stern’s and Silver’s
leadership styles and league priorities differed substantially at times, both
commissioners are responsible for the socially progressive climate in the current NBA.
In particular, the two leaders established the NBA as a league that was unafraid to

address issues of racial justice, gender equality, and LGBTQ rights, helping empower
its players to do the same (Coleman 2019; Devine 2020; Jenkins 2014). We
acknowledge that the NBA’s brand of “progressivism” does not necessarily extend
beyond the aforementioned social issues into a more expansive leftist policy agenda,
including universal healthcare, environmental justice, or deep structural changes to the
free market system. Instead, we use the term “progressive” in this chapter to refer to
support for social and cultural change that would bring about equality for minority
groups, which is attractive to, if not demanded by, a politically left-leaning fan base.
As commissioner from 1984 to 2014, David Stern was a brash and sometimes
authoritarian perfectionist who viewed his essential role as being the league’s
“bodyguard,” protecting its reputation and economic growth at all costs (Ballard 2018).
The financial success of the league during Stern’s tenure is undeniable, with revenues
increasing from $118 million in 1983 to $4.6 billion in 2013 (Badenhausen 2014).
Certainly, had the NBA not become a global powerhouse under Stern, the public
platform that today’s NBA players enjoy in speaking on social issues would be much
smaller.
As part of his plan to turn the NBA into an economic and cultural juggernaut, Stern
did not hesitate to feature prominent Black players as the league’s superstars and main
attractions. Internally, he worked behind the scenes to help two of these superstars,
Magic Johnson and Michael Jordan, become among the first Black NBA owners after
their playing careers had ended (Devine 2020). In league and team offices, the NBA
received increasingly higher grades on racial and gender diversity in hiring from the
Institute for Diversity in Ethics and Sport, with consistently better scores than other
major U.S. sports leagues (Devine 2020). During this time, the NBA fan base became
more racially diverse (Nielsen 2016; Silver 2014) as the league embraced hip-hop
music and Black celebrities as part of their culture (Boyd 2008).
Of course, Stern’s tenure as commissioner did not pass without deserved criticism
of some of his more reactionary decisions. Non-superstar Black players like Craig
Hodges and Mahmoud Adbul-Rauf—who challenged league and government
authorities on political and social issues in the 1990s—saw their NBA careers end early
without support from Stern (Devine 2020; Woike 2020). The dress code that Stern
established in 2005 in response to the “urban” (i.e., not White, middle class, business
casual) clothing preferences of many Black players was myopic at best and racist at
worst (McDonald and Toglia 2010). To avoid the dreaded “thug” label being applied
to the league, Stern had no qualms about severely punishing Black players for quasicriminal acts such as the “Malice in the Palace” fight that spilled into the crowd or
Gilbert Arenas’s brandishing of a gun in his team’s locker room (Abrams 2012;
Leonard 2010; Lorenz and Murray 2014).
Adam Silver served as deputy NBA commissioner for over a decade under Stern
until becoming his successor in 2014. In contrast to Stern, Silver is an empathetic
leader, known for his tendency to seek out contrasting perspectives and willingness to
make himself vulnerable (Jenkins 2014). Silver displayed his commitment to social
justice before joining the NBA, working pro bono at a legal aid clinic in Chicago while
in law school (ibid), and he has continued that commitment as commissioner. For
example, in 2017, Silver moved the NBA All-Star Game away from Charlotte after the
state of North Carolina implemented an anti-LGBTQ piece of legislation (Nadkami
2017). In terms of gender equity, he continues to promote and invest in the Women’s
National Basketball Association (WNBA), albeit without great financial success and to

a lesser degree than WNBA players and fans of women’s basketball would like to see
(Fader 2018).
Silver’s defining moment as a socially progressive commissioner came very early
in his tenure and in a very public way. He banned Los Angeles Clippers owner Donald
Sterling from the NBA for life and essentially forced him to sell the team after Sterling’s
racist comments were caught on tape (Jenkins 2014; Nadkami 2017). His ability to
make such a decisive call after considering and integrating multiple viewpoints was a
key to his success, as it was again in 2017 in the midst of the NFL anthem protests.
Silver quietly reminded teams of the NBA’s requirement (in place since 1981) that
players and team personnel stand during the national anthem, but he accompanied that
reminder with a memo encouraging players to pursue their social consciousness to find
a “meaningful way to make [a] difference” (Mather 2020). Before and since, he has
publicly supported protest statements by players inside and outside of NBA arenas, such
as the photo of the entire Miami Heat team wearing hoodies in honor of Trayvon Martin,
a Black unarmed teenager killed while walking in his neighborhood. In another
incidence, players from multiple teams wore “I Can’t Breathe” t-shirts during warmups in memory of Eric Garner, a Black man who died of suffocation after New York
police applied a chokehold (Wulf, 2019). While leaders like Colin Kaepernick and
LeBron James have spearheaded the recent renaissance of player activism, the NBA
under Silver has been more supportive of protest and more willing to amplify players’
voices than other leagues.
The one recent misstep that challenges Silver’s progressive approach is his reaction
to the Hong Kong controversy. On October 4, 2019, Daryl Morey, general manager of
the Houston Rockets (the most popular NBA team in China due in part to its association
with Chinese basketball star Yao Ming), tweeted in support of the anti-government
Hong Kong protesters, who were challenging a new Chinese extradition law (Nguyen
2019). The tweet was met with immediate backlash from the Chinese government, as
well as media, broadcast partners, and fans in mainland China (Schneider 2019). The
NBA’s business interests in China, where more people watch the NBA than in the
United States, were clearly threatened (ibid.). LeBron James was critical of the tweet,
which Morey had since taken down, while Silver issued a statement that supported
Morey’s right to free speech while clearly avoiding taking the side of the prodemocracy protesters over the Chinese government (Kharpal 2019). The commissioner
was chastised from all sides for his noncommittal stance, including by Chinese state
media, American sportswriters, and U.S. Vice President Mike Pence (Mangan 2019).
When the pandemic hit, Silver likely considered that if the NBA appeared to value
profits over human lives for a second time in a season by continuing to play, it may
have lasting negative consequences for its image and its business.

THE PARTISANSHIP OF THE NBA
As the NBA has carved out a singular identity among U.S. sports leagues, the wider
political context of the country has been changing rapidly. Since the late 1970s,
Americans have grown increasingly polarized along party lines, meaning that people
with the same policy preferences sort themselves more neatly into the two major
national political parties, Republicans and Democrats (McCarthy et al., 2016; Sides et
al., 2019). To a far greater extent than in the past, Republicans are more consistently
conservative across a range of issues, and Democrats tend to be more uniformly liberal.
At the same time, political scientists have noted the rise of “negative partisanship,” in
which Americans cast their votes based on antagonism towards the opposing party,
rather than a genuine enthusiasm for their preferred party (Abramowitz and Webster

2016; Sides et al. 2019). The upshot of these changes is that politics are more sharply
divided and more hostile than they have been in decades.
But politics do not stay confined to the political arena. Research has shown that
party membership is now more likely to align with other identities than in past (Mason
2018). For example, Democrats are more likely to be urban, young, college-educated,
and people of color, while the Republican Party skews toward rural and older White
people without college degrees. As multiple identities stack up and get tied together,
they become an even more powerful social dividing line. Today, Republicans and
Democrats are likely to choose a neighborhood based on its political leanings (Sussell
2013), and a majority of people oppose their children marrying someone of another
political party (Vavreck 2017). One study even found evidence that people modify their
religious identities over time to be more line with their political preferences (Margolis
2018). With so much tied to political identities, it is unsurprising that partisanship
appears to influence our cultural tastes in things like preferred beers, restaurants, and
leisure activities (Shi et al. 2017).
Sports have always been political. From athlete protests to political statements by
fans to team executives’ avoidance or engagement with issues of the day, sports are and
have always been entangled with the political (Edwards 2018; Kaufmann and Wolff
2010; Mirer and Grubic 2019). Fans who argue that sports ought to be a politics-free
zone are, ironically, engaged in a political act (Hartmann 2019). But sports are political
even when they do not seem to be. Each of us has our own constellation of racial
attitudes, political ideology, and partisan identity that shape the way that we think about
the social world, including which sports leagues operate decently and fairly.
The pre-game military color guard that strikes a strong Republican as a respectful,
patriotic gesture may seem like a gratuitous nationalistic display to a strong Democrat
(Lindner and Hawkins 2020b). In our past research, we have shown that Republicans
are significantly more likely to view soccer as “un-American” compared to sports like
American football and baseball (Lindner and Hawkins 2012). Partisan identities are
associated with not only preferences among sports, but also with beliefs about which
leagues present their sport “the right way” (Paine et al. 2017).
In October 2017, we commissioned a nationally representative online survey of
1,089 respondents living in the United States conducted by SurveyMonkey Audiences
to better understand the links among attitudes about sports, political beliefs, and
individual sociodemographic characteristics. Because Whites and women were slightly
overrepresented in the sample, we weighted all results to reflect national proportions in
terms of race and gender. In the survey (margin of error: ±3.1%), we asked respondents
about how often they watch various sports when in season either on TV or in person
with the options, “Never,” “Rarely,” “Occasionally,” “Frequently,” or “Never Miss A
Game.” We also inquired about specific sports leagues and asked respondents to rate
each league on a “feeling thermometer,” assigning it a number from 0 (“as cold and
negative as possible”) to 100 (“as warm and positive as possible”), with 50 as the neutral
point.

Figure 1 depicts the average frequency of watching various sports by political
party. The sports are arranged vertically from the most watched sport (the NFL) to the
least (any soccer). The colored dots indicate the average for Republicans (red),
Independents (gray), and Democrats (blue). The typical pattern is for Republicans and
independents to watch somewhat more of the major sports than Democrats. That is true
of the NFL, MLB, NHL, college football, and college basketball. The exceptions to that
general pattern are soccer—a sport which has only relatively recently developed a
major league in the United States—and the NBA. Republicans tend to watch the NBA
less than either Democrats or independents, but it is not because they don’t like
basketball. In fact, Republicans watch more college basketball than Democrats.

Figure 1: Average In-Season Sports Watching Frequency By Party
Source: Lindner and Hawkins, 2020a

When asked to rate their feelings about college basketball and the NBA on a scale
from 0 to 100, the partisan disparity is even more pronounced. As Figure 2 reveals, a
fair number of Republicans feel warmly about intercollegiate basketball, with a higher
proportion of Republicans give it a “100” than Democrats. When it comes to the NBA,
however, Republicans are much more likely to give the league a “0.” Democrats and
independents account for the vast majority of the most enthusiastic fans of the league.
If news reports suggest the league itself has adopted a progressive stance in recent
years, our findings show that the NBA fan base leans more Democratic than any of the
other major sports leagues. In part, that may be because NBA fans also skew young,
urban, and non-White – identities traditionally affiliated with the Democratic Party.
Nonetheless, in a regression model, controlling for age, race, urban/rural/suburban
context, gender, and income, Democrats still reported NBA feeling thermometer scores
that were 7.5 points higher than Republicans and 6.6 points higher than independents.

Figure 2: College Basketball and NBA Feeling Thermometer By Party
Source: Lindner and Hawkins, 2020a

The partisan lean of the NBA has become increasingly visible during the 2016
election and subsequent presidency of Donald Trump. Both as a candidate and since
taking office, Trump has used racist language, spoken favorably of White nationalists,
and repeatedly clashed with prominent Black journalists and public figures (Coates
2017; Graham et al. 2019). It is not surprising, then, that some Black players in a league
context that has welcomed activism have been outspoken in their rejection of Trump’s
rhetoric and policies. When the Golden State Warriors won the NBA Championship in
2017, Trump’s first year in office, All-Star guard Steph Curry and other members of
the team said in interviews that they did not want to participate in the customary ritual
of visiting the White House. In a hasty and petulant tweet, Trump rescinded the team’s
invitation (Balthaser et al. 2017). Many other players immediately entered the social
media fray, with Cleveland Cavaliers guard LeBron James calling Trump a “bum” and
adding that “[g]oing to the White House was an honor until you showed up!” Retired
NBA legend Kobe Bryant tweeted that Trump’s “name alone creates division and
anger” (Reynolds 2017). In the years since, players and several coaches, including the
Warriors’ Steve Kerr and the Spurs’ Gregg Popovich, have repeatedly criticized Trump
in public. Though Adam Silver and the league office have tried to balance defending
players and avoiding conflict with Trump, it is clear that, from the players to the fans
to the league leadership, the NBA has taken on a strong identity as a progressive league,
far more closely aligned with Democratic principles than those of the Republican Party.

HOW COVID-19 BECAME PARTISAN
Years before COVID-19 entered the national consciousness, Americans’ views on a
wide range of issues—from immigration to healthcare to climate change—were
polarized. Though partisan polarization had been increasing since the 1970s, the

election of President Trump in 2016 only deepened the division and rancor within the
country. A majority of Americans disapproved of Trump’s job performance for most
of his term, averaging the worst approval rating of any U.S. President in the history of
modern polling (Silver 2020). Blacks, Hispanics, young voters, and college-educated
people all held strongly negative views of the President, while a proportionally large
but demographically declining pool of White, older, rural, non-college educated voters
formed the base of the Republican Party (Doherty et al., 2018).
As the 2020 Presidential Election year began, most of Trump’s marquee initiatives
had failed or become quite unpopular (Crowley 2019; Scott and Kliff 2017). The travel
ban on majority-Muslim countries blocked by the courts. The nonexistent expansion of
the wall along the Mexican border, intended to prevent an alleged “invading horde” of
drug smugglers, human traffickers, and sick migrants. A massive tax cut, which
disproportionately favored the wealthy. Friendly overtures to authoritarian leaders like
Vladimir Putin of Russia and Kim Jong-un of North Korea, while eschewing traditional
diplomatic ties with western European allies. And that is to say nothing of his Twitter
account, which even his Republican allies in Congress were repeatedly forced to
describe as “unfortunate” (Associated Press 2019).
The one bright spot, in a period that otherwise felt chaotic, was a robust economy
with continuous job growth, historically low unemployment rates, and even modest
growth in wages. Even with low approval ratings, an incumbent President with a strong
economy stands a fair chance of reelection, and the Trump campaign had already built
a 2020 strategy around the strength of the economy (Frazee 2020; Lowrey 2020). For
both Trump and his ardent supporters, protecting the talking point of a good economy
was crucial to the success of the campaign. It is against this backdrop that the public’s
unusual response to coronavirus in the United States must be understood.
Normally, emergency responses are not politically divisive, but rather offer
moments of rare bipartisanship. Hurricanes, tornados, and immediate public health
threats tend to concern politicians of all stripes. Memorably, in 2012, Republican
Governor of New Jersey Chris Christie and Democratic President Barack Obama
hugged after working cooperatively in the wake of Hurricane Sandy (Miller 2016).
Initially, the story about a novel coronavirus in Wuhan, China, was regarded with
the same devout, bipartisan inattention that the American public pays to most
international news. In another administration, regardless of public interest, the
president, public health officials, the State Department, and the national security
apparatus might have moved quickly and coordinated with other governments to
contain the spread of the virus, while laying the groundwork for a potentially long
mitigation battle.
But, in mid-February, with only fifteen known cases of Covid-19 in the United
States, the Trump Administration, through some combination of isolationist impulses
and a concern that the optics of a strong response might spook markets, deliberately
slow-walked the response. “The 15 within a couple of days is going to be down to close
to zero,” said Trump at a February 26 press conference, urging Americans to travel,
dine in at restaurants, and continue life as usual (Watkins et al. 2020). Despite the
suggestion of public heedlessness, in private Trump received multiple briefings
projecting “as many as half a million deaths and trillions of dollars in economic losses,”
calling for the immediate shutdown of major cities and requesting the rapid ramping up
of testing capacity (Lipton et al. 2020). Yet, for weeks, the administration largely
declined to take actions beyond limiting travel from China.

Figure 3: Coronavirus as a Share of Top Newspaper and Online News Sources
Source: Lindner and Hawkins, 2020a

Though the Trump campaign had electoral incentives to keep the economy open
and abuzz, the president was far from alone in minimizing the risk posed by Covid-19.
According to Media Cloud’s collections of Top Newspapers and Top Online news
sources, during the week of Feb. 17-23, stories including the term “coronavirus”
accounted for only 9.3-13.7% of all news coverage. Much of the media coverage was,
instead, intensely focused on the Democratic Presidential Primary race. Not until March
12, the morning after the NBA suspended its season, would the Covid-19 story leap to
dominate 70%+ of all top newspaper and online coverage (see Figure 3). As late as
March 2, even the Democratic Mayor of New York City Bill de Blasio said, “I’m
encouraging New Yorkers to go on with your lives and get out on the town” (Watkins
et al. 2020).
Still, concern about the virus that would spiral into a pandemic was not
symmetrical on both sides of the partisan aisle. With Trump comparing Covid-19 to the
seasonal flu and conservative cable news commentators downplaying the severity of
the pandemic, everyday Republicans began taking cues from their fellow partisans.
Figure 4 shows a weighted average from three different polls conducted in the week
before March 11 by YouGov/The Economist, SurveyMonkey/New York Times, and
YouGov/Huffington Post. In each poll, survey respondents were asked how concerned
they were that they or a family member would contract the coronavirus. While 65.3%
of Democrats and nearly half of independents were “very” or “somewhat” concerned,
only 39.8% of Republican expressed similar concern. As the pandemic continued,
researchers have found that Democrats are the most likely and Republicans the least
likely to adopt safety precautions around the virus, including wearing masks, social
distancing, and staying at home (Bird & Ritter, 2020). One study even found that
counties with higher viewership of the popular Fox News television program Hannity—
hosted by highly conservative political commentator, Trump ally, and periodic

conspiracy theorist, Sean Hannity—had higher Covid-19 infection and mortality rates
(Bursztyn et al. 2020).

Figure 4: Americans' Concern With Contracting Coronavirus By Party
Source: Lindner and Hawkins, 2020a

With the growing partisan divide around the pandemic, almost any Covid-19
mitigation measure took on a political hue. Wearing a mask, for example, quickly
became a tacit signal of resistance to the president who briefly claimed the virus was “a
new hoax” (Clinch et al. 2020). To a less progressive entity like the NCAA, whose
football fans skew strongly conservative and whose basketball fans skew slightly
conservative, shutting down March Madness might be seen as caving to Democrats’
politically motivated fearmongering. Never mind that an organization devoted to
intercollegiate athletics might concern themselves with student-athletes’ health above
all else, the NCAA’s decision early in the day on March 11 to continue with the
basketball tournaments in empty arenas was a careful threading of the political needle.
The NBA, by contrast, was perfectly positioned to demonstrate leadership in the
fight to mitigate Covid-19 by shutting down. With a liberal-leaning fan base, as well as
players and coaches who had openly feuded with Trump, the league could adopt a
strong public health stance, which, even if interpreted as political, was unlikely to be
met with backlash internally or externally. Furthermore, after four decades of forwardthinking leadership from David Stern and, subsequently, his protégé Adam Silver, the
entire NBA community—from owners to fans—had come to expect decisive, socially
responsible action from the top. Indeed, if anything, Silver was still smarting from the
public lashing for his financially-minded response to the Hong Kong incident. He may
well have been eager to demonstrate the NBA’s continued capacity for civic
responsibility.
Of course, the practical considerations mattered, too, but the NBA’s leading role
in the pandemic response was no coincidence. In a context of heightened partisanship,
the NBA has become the leading bastion of progressivism in U.S. sports. When a
divisive, racially incendiary President failed to muster an adequate response to a dire
threat, the choice for the NBA to act boldly was an obvious one. Silver’s “split-second”
decision had been decades in the making.

THE NBA STEPS UP
Silver’s decision to suspend all games filled a leadership vacuum. After the NBA’s
announcement, in quick succession, MLB canceled spring training and delayed
Opening Day, MLS announced a thirty-day suspension of games, and the NHL, citing
the NBA’s response, suspended the hockey season. Only after several universities and
conferences suspended all athletic activities did the NCAA reluctantly cancel March
Madness and other spring tournaments on March 12. As Roxanne Jones (2020) wrote
in a CNN.com op-ed, “Silver didn't hesitate to make the right call for the NBA, and the
right call for America. For me, Silver's decision is a sobering but inspiring reminder
that true commitment to social responsibility means that capitalism doesn't always have
to mean profits over people.”
The plaudits for Silver and the NBA’s decisive action extended beyond ESPN and
sports radio. The decision was one of the first moments where it registered with the
news media and the U.S. public that the pandemic was real and required drastic
measures. As David Wallace-Wells (2020) would later write in New York Magazine,
“…nearly all of the efforts we have seen…to produce social distance and cancel large
group events have come from private organizations and even individuals—private
schools, private companies, particular conferences, the NBA. There has been no
meaningful centralized leadership of any kind…” The need for the NBA to step up was
borne of the remarkable absence of leadership from the Trump Administration.
Some accounts of Silver’s actions on March 11 valorize him as some kind of
heroic, moral visionary. While Silver appears to be a smart, competent, and decent
person, such “great man of history” accounts fail to envision him (and other less
courageous sports executives) in the appropriate sociological context. Though the
decision to suspend bears enormous financial consequences, with a potential loss of
half a billion dollars in ticket revenue alone (Schaefer, 2020), the social conditions
surrounding the NBA made it a much easier call for Silver than would be the case in
several other leagues. The NBA announcement may have caught owners, players, and
fans by surprise. But Silver could make the decision will full confidence not merely
because it was “the right thing to do,” but also because it was a palatable political act
for most of the constituencies he serves.
The NBA is a business, not a social movement. Like any business, there have been
episodes in the NBA’s history where owners and league executives prioritized growing
capital over the interests of labor. Nonetheless, over the past several decades, the NBA
has become a business where players have a voice and power and where socially
responsible, progressive values are espoused (if not always perfectly practiced). In an
age of partisan polarization, that’s enough to make the NBA a liberal context. As the
Trump administration’s electorally-minded denialism began to polarize the public on
the response to the pandemic, it was the sports world’s left-leaning uncle, the NBA that
inevitably became the first mover in the shutdown of sports.

REFERENCES
Abramowitz, Alan I., and Steven Webster. 2016. “The Rise of Negative Partisanship
and the Nationalization of U.S. Elections in the 21st Century.” Electoral
Studies 41: 12–22. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2015.11.001.
Abrams, Jonathan. 2012. “The Malice at the Palace: An Oral History of the Scariest
Moment
in
NBA History.”
Grantland,
March 20,
2012.
https://grantland.com/features/an-oral-history-malice-palace/.
Associated Press. 2019. “McConnell Calls Trump Lynching Tweet Unfortunate.”
Associated
Press,
October
22,
2019.
https://apnews.com/d009196599de4fa5903dba60fa8ce763.
Badenhausen, Kurt. 2014. “As Stern Says Goodbye, Knicks, Lakers Set Records As
NBA's Most Valuable Teams.” Forbes, January 22, 2014.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kurtbadenhausen/2014/01/22/as-stern-saysgoodbye-knicks-lakers-set-records-as-nbas-most-valuableteams/#3928cd0465b6.
Ballard, Chris. 2018. “Pressing Forward: David Stern Is Not Looking Back.” Sports
Illustrated, October 24, 2018. https://www.si.com/nba/2018/10/24/davidstern-adam-silver-lebron-james-chris-paul-donald-trump-lakers-hornets.
Balthaser, Dalton, Christina Daly, and Bella Santos. 2017. “Trump Upsets a Bunch of
NBA Players, Too, Withdraws Invite to Warriors.” NBC Sports Philadelphia,
September
24,
2017.
https://www.nbcsports.com/philadelphia/the700level/trump-upsets-bunchnba-players-too-withdraws-invite-warriors.
Bird, Robert, and Zacc Ritter. 2020. “Is the Media Creating Division on COVID-19
Health
Practices?”
Gallup.com,
June
26,
2020.
https://news.gallup.com/poll/312749/media-creating-division-covid-healthpractices.aspx.
Boyd, Todd. 2008. Young, Black, Rich, and Famous: The Rise of the NBA, the Hip Hop
Invasion, and the Transformation of American Culture. Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press.
Bursztyn, Leonardo, Aakaash Rao, Christopher Roth, and David Yanagizawa-Drott.
2020. "Misinformation during a Pandemic." University of Chicago, Becker
Friedman Institute for Economics Working Paper 2020-44.
https://www.nber.org/papers/w27417.
Cacciola, Scott, and Sopan Deb. 2020. “A Dark Day for Basketball.” The New York
Times,
March
12,
2020.https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/11/sports/basketball/nba-seasonsuspended-coronavirus.html.
Clinch, Matt, Dawn Kopecki, and Ted Kemp. 2020. “Trump Calls Outbreak a 'Hoax,'
South Korea Has Record Jump in Cases.” CNBC, February 28, 2020.
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/02/28/coronavirus-latest-updates-chinahubei.html.
Coates, Ta-Nehisi. 2018. “The First White President.” The Atlantic, May 22, 2018.
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/10/the-first-whitepresident-ta-nehisi-coates/537909/.

Coleman, Aaron Ross. 2019. “How NBA Players Became the World’s Highest-Paid
Union Workers.” GQ, October 24, 2019. https://www.gq.com/story/nbaplayers-union.
Crowley, Michael. 2019. “Trump Heads Into 2020 With No Clear Policy Agenda. But
It May Not Matter.” The New York Times, September 5, 2019.
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/04/us/politics/trump-2020-policyagenda.html.
Devine, Dan. 2020. “The Profound Legacy of David Stern, the NBA’s Most
Consequential Off-Court Force.” The Ringer, January 1, 2020.
https://www.theringer.com/nba/2020/1/1/21045783/david-stern-obituarynba-commissioner.
Doherty, Carroll, Jocelyn Kiley, and Bridget Johnson. 2018. “An Examination of the
2016 Electorate, Based on Validated Voters.” Pew Research Center, August
8, 2018. https://www.people-press.org/2018/08/09/an-examination-of-the2016-electorate-based-on-validated-voters/.
Edwards, Harry. 2018. The Revolt of the Black Athlete. Urbana, IL: University of
Illinois Press.
Fader, Mirin. 2018. “Inside the WNBA’s Fight for Higher Pay.” Bleacher Report,
October 29, 2018. https://bleacherreport.com/articles/2802759-inside-thewnbas-fight-for-higher-pay.
Frazee, Gretchen. 2020. “Trump Is Betting on the Economy. Is It Enough to Win
Reelection?”
PBS,.
February
4,
2020.
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/trump-is-betting-on-the-economy-isit-enough-to-win-reelection.
Graham, David A., Adrienne Green, Cullen Murphy, and Parker Richards. 2019. “An
Oral History of Trump's Bigotry.” The Atlantic,
May 20, 2019.
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/06/trump-racismcomments/588067/.
Hartmann, Douglas. 2019. “The Olympic ‘Revolt’ of 1968 and Its Lessons for
Contemporary African American Athletic Activism.” European Journal of
American Studies 14, no. 1. https://doi.org/10.4000/ejas.14335Jenkins, Lee.
2014. “New Commissioner Adam Silver Is His Own Man.” Sports Illustrated.
May 20, 2014. https://vault.si.com/vault/2014/05/26/all-of-us-not-leastdonald-sterling-now-know-this-adam-silver-commissioner-is-his-own-man.
Jones, Roxanne. 2020. “How NBA Led in the Sports World Shutdown.” CNN, . March
13,
2020.
https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/13/opinions/nba-coronavirusleadership-for-sports-leagues-jones/index.html.
Kharpal, Arjun. 2019. “Chinese State Media Slams NBA’s Free Speech Comments,
Accuses Silver of Supporting Violence in Hong Kong Protests.” CNBC.
October 9, 2019. https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/09/nba-adam-silverslammed-by-chinese-state-media-over-morey-support.html.
Kaufman, Peter, and Eli A. Wolff. 2010. “Playing and Protesting: Sport as a Vehicle
for Social Change.” Journal of Sport and Social Issues 34, no. 2: 154–75.
doi:10.1177/0193723509360218.
Leonard, David J. 2010. “Jumping the Gun: Sporting Cultures and the Criminalization
of Black Masculinity.” Journal of Sport and Social Issues 34, no. 2: 252-262.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0193723510367781.

Lindner, Andrew M., and Daniel N. Hawkins. 2012. “Globalization, Culture Wars, and
Attitudes Toward Soccer in America: An Empirical Assessment of How
Soccer Explains the World.” The Sociological Quarterly 53, no. 1: 68–91.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1533-8525.2011.01226.x.
Lindner, Andrew M., and Daniel N. Hawkins. 2020b. “America’s Most Divided Sport:
Polarization and Inequality in Attitudes About Youth Football.” SocArXiv.
June 24. https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/xgscj.
Lipton, Eric, David E Sanger, Maggie Haberman, Michael D Shear, Mark Mazzetti,
and Julian E Barnes. 2020. “He Could Have Seen What Was Coming: Behind
Trump's Failure on the Virus.” The New York Times, April 11, 2020.
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/11/us/politics/coronavirus-trumpresponse.html.
Lorenz, Stacy and Rod Murray. 2014. “’Goodbye to the Gangstas’: The NBA Dress
Code, Ray Emery, and the Policing of Blackness in Basketball and Hockey.”
Journal of Sport and Social Issues 38, no. 1: 23-50. https://doi.org/
10.1177/0193723513491750.
Lowrey, Annie. 2020. “The Economy Is Collapsing. So Are Trump's Reelection
Chances.”
The
Atlantic,
April
3,
2020.
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/04/most-important-numbertrumps-re-election-chances/609376/.
Mangan, Dan. 2019. “Vice President Mike Pence Says ‘NBA Is Acting Like a Wholly
Owned Subsidiary’ of China’s Communist Party, Also Blasts Nike.” CNBC.
October 24, 2019. https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/24/vice-president-mikepence-says-nba-acting-like-subsidiary-of-china.html.
Margolis, Michele F. 2018. From Politics to the Pews: How Partisanship and the
Political Environment Shape Religious Identity. Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press.
Mather, Victor. 2020. “How Sports Leagues Regulate Athletes’ Activism.” The New
York
Times.
June
10,
2020.
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/10/sports/national-anthem-policies.html.
McCarty, Nolan M., Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. 2016. Polarized America:
the Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The
MIT Press.
McDonald, Mary G. and Jessica Toglia. 2010. “Dressed for Success? The NBA's Dress
Code, the Workings of Whiteness and Corporate Culture.” Sport in Society 13,
no. 6: 970-983. https://doi.org/10.1080/17430437.2010.49126.
Miller, Zeke J. 2016. “Chris Christie: Barack Obama 'Hug' Never Happened.” Time,
February 4, 2016. https://time.com/4207368/chris-christie-barack-obamahug/.
Mirer, Michael, and Adrianne Grubic. 2019. “Promotional Space or Public Forum:
Protest Coverage and Reader Response in Team-Operated Media.”
Communication & Sport 8, no. 4-5: 489-506. https://doi.org/
10.1177/2167479519894997.
Nadkarni, Rohan. 2020. “The NBA’s Return Will Define Adam Silver’s Legacy as
Commissioner.”
Sports
Illustrated,
June
10,
2020.

https://www.si.com/nba/2020/06/10/nba-return-coronavirus-adam-silverlegacy.
Nguyen, Terry. 2019. “American Brands Are Trying to Play Both Sides of the Hong
Kong-China Conflict.” Vox. October 11, 2019. https://www.vox.com/thegoods/2019/10/11/20910039/american-brands-hong-kong-china-conflict.
Nielsen. 2016. “Hoop Dreams: Multicultural Diversity in NBA Viewership.” Nielsen,
https://www.nielsen.com/us/en/insights/article/2015/hoop-dreamsmulticultural-diversity-in-nba-viewership/.
Paine, Neil, Harry Enten, and Andrea Jones-Rooy. 2017. “How Every NFL Team's Fans
Lean
Politically.”
FiveThirtyEight,
September
29,
2017.
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-every-nfl-teams-fans-leanpolitically/.
Reynolds, Tim. 2017. “NBA Players Express Frustration with Donald Trump's Words.”
NBA.com, September 25, 2017. https://www.nba.com/article/2017/09/25/nbaplayers-lebron-media-day-donald-trump.
Schaefer, Rob. 2020. “Report: NBA Could Lose 'Nearly $500 Million' in Ticket
Revenue without Games.” NBC Sports, March 12, 2020.
https://www.nbcsports.com/chicago/bulls/report-nba-could-lose-nearly-500million-ticket-revenue-without-games
Schneider, Mac. 2019. “China’s Fight with the NBA, Explained.” Vox, November 11,
2019.
https://www.vox.com/videos/2019/11/11/20959250/china-nbahouston-rockets-hong-kong.
Schuchat Anne. 2020. “Health Response to the Initiation and Spread of Pandemic
COVID-19 in the United States, February 24–April 21.” Morbidity and
Mortality Weekly Report 69, no. 18: 551–556. Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention. http://dx.doi.org/10.15585/mmwr.mm6918e2.
Scott, Dylan, and Sarah Kliff. 2017. “Why Obamacare Repeal Failed.” Vox, July 31,
2017. https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/7/31/16055960/whyobamacare-repeal-failed.
Shelburne, Ramona. 2020. “Inside the NBA Coronavirus Shutdown: How a Few Tense
Hours
Changed
Everything.”
ESPN.com,
March
13,
2020.
https://www.espn.com/nba/story/_/id/28897195/inside-nba-coronavirusshutdown-how-tense-hours-changed-everything.
Shi, Yongren, Kai Mast, Ingmar Weber, Agrippa Kellum, and Michael Macy. 2017.
“Cultural Fault Lines and Political Polarization.” Proceedings of the 2017
ACM
on
Web
Science
Conference
WebSci
17.
https://doi.org/10.1145/3091478.3091520.
Sides, John, Michael Tesler, and Lynn Vavreck. 2019. Identity Crisis: The 2016
Presidential Campaign and the Battle for the Meaning of America. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Silver, Nate. 2014. “The Clippers, Like Many NBA Teams, Have a Majority-Minority
Fan
Base.”
FiveThirtyEight,
April
29,
2014.
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-clippers-like-many-nba-teams-havea-majority-minority-fan-base/.
Silver, Nate. 2020. “How Popular Is Donald Trump?” FiveThirtyEight. June 29, 2020.
https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/trump-approval-ratings/.

Sussell, Jesse. 2013. “New Support for the Big Sort Hypothesis: An Assessment of
Partisan Geographic Sorting in California, 1992–2010.” PS: Political Science
& Politics 46, no. 04: 768–73. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1049096513001042.
Vavreck, Lynn. 2017. “A Measure of Identity: Are You Wedded to Your Party?” The
New
York
Times,
January
31,
2017.
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/31/upshot/are-you-married-to-yourparty.html.
Wallace-Wells, David. 2020. “America Is Broken.” New York Magazine, March 16,
2020.
https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/03/coronavirus-shows-usamerica-is-broken.html
Watkins, Derek, Josh Holder, James Glanz, Weiyi Cai, Benedict Carey, and Jeremy
White. 2020. “How the Virus Won.” The New York Times, June 25, 2020.
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/coronavirus-spread.html.
Woike, Dan. 2020. “NBA Players’ Activism Is Not New, but Shaping Change Would
Be.”
Los
Angeles
Times,
July
25,
2020.
https://www.latimes.com/sports/story/2020-07-25/nba-players-activism-isnot-new-but-shaping-change-would-be.
Wulf, Steve. 2019. “Athletes and Activism: The Long, Defiant History of Sports
Protests.”
The
Undefeated,
January
30,
2019.
https://theundefeated.com/features/athletes-and-activism-the-long-defianthistory-of-sports-protests/.

